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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
CUBA-US: The Counterattack on Radio Marti	
by CIA	25 1
The recent spate of authoritative warnings from Havana about the US's new Radio Martireinforced last week by increased interference with several US commercial stationsis intended to demonstrate to Washington that Cuba will retaliate vigorously against planned US broadcasts confirm Havana's claims that it has the capability to respond with jamming and powerful broadcasts of its own.	25X1 25X1
Deputy Foreign Minister Alarcon, the official in charge of Cuba's counterbroadcasts, told a US journalist last month that Havana would jam some US commercial broadcasting if Radio Marti went on the air. He warned that the US is much more vulnerable than Cuba to such interference. Increased interference was noted by several US broadcasters on 30 August.	2 <b>5</b> X1
President Castro and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro also warned of retaliation during informal con- versations on 18 August with Western journalists visiting Cuba. The remarks of these three key officials presumably were timed to coincide with consideration of the Radio Marti funding bill by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.	2 <b>5X</b> 1 .
The Cubans apparently are counting on US broadcasters and their clients to persuade the administration, either directly or through Congress, to drop plans for the broadcasts. Alarcon has admitted as much. His comments suggest the Cuban Government believes it can outlast the US in the event of a radiobroadcasting and jamming war.	2{ 1
Evidence of Cuban Intentions	25
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plans to create Radio Marti were announced by Washington last September, eight transmitter sites have been modified by the construction of additional towers to form antenna arrays oriented toward the US.
The arrays are designed either to jam broadcasts from the US or to beam programs into the US. Erected speedily, at least two of these new antenna systems appear to have been ready by 28 January, the date originally set for the inauguration of Radio Marti.
Since September 1981 Havana has shifted a number of medium-wave stations to different frequencies. These changes have reduced interference with other broadcasters in the region while increasing interference with US stations.
A fairly reliable source reports that, in response to an urgent Cuban request, Czechoslovakia last October was providing Havana with four 1-kilowatt mobile radio transmitters and would send 10 5-kilowatt transmitters in 1982. These transmitters probably were to be used as jammers or to free more powerful Cuban transmitters for jamming or counterbroadcasts.
Several sources have reported that Havana's plans for retaliation include broadcasts in English over high-powered transmitters. The Cubans will name this effort Radio Lincoln. Castro has warned that the counterbroadcasts will focus on fomenting civil strife in the US.
Cuban Vulnerability
The outspoken condemnations of US plans for Radio Marti by Cuban officials and the aggressive, costly campaign to counter it indicate the depth of Castro's concern. This apparently stems in large part from fears his control of virtually all of the media to which Cubans have access may be seriously challenged at a time of increasing austerity. Moreover, there are clear signs of a widening gap between the leadership and the postrevolution generation, as high school and university graduates try to find scarce jobs and places to live.
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
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